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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSUR.A.NCE FUND, 
administered by the Con1mission 'Of 
Finance of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THO!tiAS L. DYI{ES, THE INDUS-
TRIAL C011NIISSION OF UTAH, 
and INTERniOUXT.A.IN S E R-
VICE BUREAU, INC., doing busi-
ness as ~ferchants Police, 
Defendants. 
No. 7196 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
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STATE OF UTAH 
Tl-IE ST.A_TE IXSl-:-R .... \.NCE Fl1 XD, 
athninistered by the Counnission of 
Plaintiff, 
YS. 
TI-!0:-.L~-\S r .. DYI(ES, TilE INDUS-
TRL.:\_1 .. C():JfjiiSSIOX OF UTAH, 
and T~\1.,-ER~lOlTXT.L'\.I~ S E R-
\~ICE J)ITRE.A_l~, INC., doing busi~ 
11(-'~.~ a~ :\Ierchants Police, 
Defendants. 
No. 7196 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
-
·sTATE~iENT 
\\T e haYe recently been supplied with a copy of the 
1\ ttorney General's brief, \Yhich he has entitled DE FEN-
DANT 'S BRIEF and in \Yhich he defends the Industrial 
Connnission 's deeision in this case. After reading the 
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cont(•nts of his brief, we are not sure \Vhether it is sup-
posed to defend the defendant, Intern1ountain Service 
Bureau, Inc., but it is quite apparent that his brief 
atte1npts to sustain the Industrial Comn1ission's a\Yard 
against the State Insurance Fund. We notice that the 
Attorney General accepts the statement of facts as given 
in our brief. which we filed with the ,Supreme C~ourt on 
August 13, 1948. -\V e shall herein call attention to certain 
inferences of facts eontained in the Attorney_ General's 
brief \Yhich are not supported by the evidence in the 
case. 
In our main brief ''Te discussed three points,"' Point 
No. 2 being that the Industrial Commission's decision 
was an1biguous, uncertain and incomplete. The Attorney 
General's brief eontains no argument relating to that 
point. Therefore, we presume that the Attorney General 
is \Yilling to adn1it that the It1dustrial Con1mission 's 
decision -w·as an1biguous, uncertain and incon1plete in the 
particulars which we n1entioned in our brief. We called 
attention to the failure on the part of the Industrial 
Commission to make any finding of fact or conclusion 
of law relating to workmen's compensation insurance 
coverage by the State Insurance Fund of Mr. Dykes' 
employer, the Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc. The 
Attorney General's brief has attempted to supply a 
finding of fact relating to this point. We do not know 
whether hi~ finding is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment that the Industrial Commission should have made 
the finding. But there can't be much argument against 
what we said about the ambiguity and uncertainty of the 
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Industrial Connnission 's decision. It speaks for itself. 
In our orig·inal Brief '(page 8), and in the Attorney 
GPneral"s Brief, the provision conta~ned in the State 
Insurance Fund's policy eoYering J. l\Inrtin Stoek fro1n 
.Aa~·n~t :20, 1946, to June 30, 1947, is quoted: 
··If the ernployer shall transfer his or its 
o"-nershi1) o1· 01h?:;·a tion of the business insured 
- L 
by th:s lJolicy, this poliry shall autoinatically be-
eoiile cancelled.'' ( Tr. 51.) 
\Ye argued that this provision ~uton1atically tern1inated 
:Jlr. Stock's policy 'Yhen he transferred his o-vvnership 
a11cl operation of the business as of July 1, 194 7, unless 
there \Yere cireun1stances ,,-hich -vvould VJlork an estoppel 
n~n~1~ll:'t the Fund Hpplying that provision. We called 
attention to the fact that neither J\1r. Dykes nor anyone 
else alleged or proved that there were any such circum-
stances. The Industrial Comn1ission did not find any 
facts \Yhich \vould \York such an estoppel. And the At-
torney General's brief does not mention any such facts 
or circumstances as would constitute an estoppel. How-
ever, he argues that the above-quoted provision of the 
policy did not operate to terminate ~the policy eoverage 
on July 1, 1947, because Mr. Stock became an officer 
of the corporation, Intermountain Service Bureau, and 
perhaps held some stock interest in the corporation, and 
tha~· those facts are sufficient to constitute Mr. Stock as 
the "O"\vner" and "operator" of the corporation, and 
therefore there was no "transfer" of Mr. Stock's "own-
(~rship" or "operation" of the businesfS, contrary to Mr. 
Stock's testimony. (Tr. 66.) 
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As the basis for his conclusion, the Attorney Gen-
eral has surmised that Mr. Stock "was undoubtedly a 
. . 
prominent factor, if not the full owner and 1nanager of 
the new company"; although in the same paragraph he 
adn1its that "ther,e is no evidence in the record to sho\Y 
the respective interests of any stockholders in the ne\v 
con1pany." Where, then, does he have any basis for 
assuming or surmising anything at all relating to the 
stock o'vnership of the corporation~ It vvould be just 
as reasonable to assu1ne that Mr. Stock's ov,'"nership of 
the corporation's stock was on an equal basis w~th each 
of the other incorporators, one of whom was Mr. Earl 
J_jowry, who vvas the General Manager of the corporation,· 
and who hired Mr. Dykes in August, 1947. (Tr. 42.) 
In several respects, more or less in1portant, the 
Attorney General's argument contains erroneous state-
ments of the evidence. He says, ''The new con1pany con-
tinued under the same name (Merchants Police) ''Tith no 
change in address, telephone number or telephone list-
ing and \vith little or no ch~nge in letterheads or in n1eth-
ods of operation.' __ ' The record shows that the corpora-
tion had a brand new name, Intermountain Service Bu-
reau. ( Tr. 62, 63, 65, 66 and Defen.dant 's Exhibit 4.) 
It also show·s that Mr. Stock had conducted his business 
in the Atlas Building; but the Corporation had its offices 
in the Hooper Building at 23 East 1st South. ( Tr. 51 
and 52.) There is no .testimony as to the telephone nunl-
ber before the incorporation or afterwards; but the Salt 
Lake City telephone book shows the name and nu1nber 
of the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, ''rhich w·erP not 
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listed or slunYn in the telephone book pr1or to July 1, 
1947. ,, ... e agree that the naine, "l\ferchant's Police" is 
~till listed in the telephone book as it \Yas prior to July 1, 
19·±"4, because that is one of the trade na1nes used by the 
Interinountain SerYice Bureau for part of its business 
operations. (Tr. 64, 65, 66.) It no\v has a different 
nun1ber than prior to July 1, 1947. 
The _,__\ttorney General's Brief also says, "nor vVas 
it sho\Yn at any tiine in the record that the new corprr.:. 
ration had any !:lSsets. '' \\' e can just as truly ren1ark 
that there \Yas no evidence in the record to indicate that 
the corporttion did. not have a great wealth of assets. 
_;;_:\pparently the corporation had_ enough assets to be 
concerned \Yith \Yhether the Industrial Commission might 
1nake an R\Yard against the corporation; because the 
corporation hired its own attorney to represent it in ;the 
hearing and to resist the claim on the merits. (Tr. 1 and 
• 2.) There is absolutely nothing in the· record to indica~te 
that the eorporation cannot readily pay the amount of 
the Industrial Con1mission's award to Mr. Dykes. In 
fa;_-t, if the Industrial Commission's decision were sus-
tained, it \Vould force the State Insurance Fund to pay 
the a\'.Tard, instead of requiring payment to be made 
b~T the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, where the liability 
properly belongs. 
The Attorney General's Brief says, "It is a well 
accepted principle of law that the corporate entity will 
be disregarded by the courts vvhen jus~tice requires it.'' 
But he did not point to any evidence in the record which 
"\vould require the disregard of the corporate entity of 
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the Intern1ountain Service Bureau in this case. Among 
other citations of authorities, he n1entions 13 An1. Juris., 
page 160, §7. V7 e here quote from that authority: 
''The doctrine that a corporation is a legal 
entity existing separate and apart from the per-
sons composing it is a legal theory introduced for 
the purpose of convenience and to . -subserve the 
ends of justice. The concept cannot, theref,oTe, 
be extended to a point beyond its reason and 
policy, and when invoked in support of an end 
subversive of this policy, \\Till be disregarded by 
the courts. Thus in an appropriate case and in 
furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation 
and the individual or individuals owning all its 
stock and assets will b-e treated as identical, the 
corporate entity being- disregarded 'vhere used 
as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality.'' 
( Fron1 here on is considerable discussion re-
garding the questi,on of legality of mortgages, 
stock issue!' and corporate actions which n1ight 
have the effect of defrauding creditors.) 
It plainly can be seen that such a rule has no appli-
cation to t~e situation in our present case. There was no 
allegation of illegality in the forming of the Intermoun .. 
tain Service Bureau; there was ~o evidence that anyone 
was defrauded or misled by the formation or the exis-
tence or the op'erations of this corporation; and the 
Industrial Connnission 's decision contains no· findings 
that there was any fraud or .misrepresentati,on or mis-
leading actions by or on account of the corporation. 
The case of Putnam vs.- Indust·rial Commission, 80 
Utah 187, 14 Pac. (2nd) 973, did not involve a corpora-
tion, but it did involve a situation which is somewhat 
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interesting in connection 'vith our present discussoin. 
Tht• Industrial Conunission there held that the injured 
nu1n "~as in the en1ploy of ''the City ''r aste Paper Cam-
pa ny and/ or L ... A .. Putna1n' ~ and that a certain contract 
,\~hich '• atteinpted to n1ake F. D. Gray an independent 
c·ontractor is a n1ere subterfuge designed to evade and 
defeat the provisions ·of the \V-ork1nen's Con1pensation 
.A.et. '' The Industrial Comn1ission 's award against '',the 
City \\~ aste Paper Con1pany and/ or L. A. Pu~nam'' vvas 
annulled by the Supren1e Court, as not being justified 
hy the evidence in the record. At page 210 of the Court's 
op1n1on 1~ the following: 
''Thus, '""hen the whole ·of the testimony is 
considered-as the conm1ission was required to 
consider it-and undue weight not given to mere 
snatches ,o.f it to -t.he exclusion of other evidence 
of equal if not greater in1portance, it is clear no 
finding is justified that the City _Waste Paper 
Con1pany vvas '' ovvned'' by Putnam, or that the 
busines.s after January 5th or 6th was operated 
by hi1n or h;.'" the City \Vaste Paper Company.'' 
By the san1e kind of reasoning, it can be said here that 
neither the Industrial Commission nor the Attorney 
General are justified in finding that the business of the 
corporation, the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, vvas 
"o'vned" or "onera ted" bv J. l\1artin Stock· in the 
L ~ 
n1onths of August !Or }J oven1ber, 1947, when ~1r. Dykes 
was hired and injured respectively. 
The Putnan1 case also contains a pertinent discus-
sion of the an1biguous expression, ''and/ or'' which is 
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found in . t\YO places in the Industrial Commission's de-
cision in the Dykes case. 
The argun1ent contained on the second question in 
the Att1orney General's brief relates to a consideration 
of "Exhibit B," \vhich \vas introduced into the record 
by the presiding con11nissioner over our objection. (Tr. 
55 and 63.) ''T e put son1e discussion regarding this ex-
hibit in our original brief commencing at Page 14. As 
-vve stated there, we did not consider that this exhibit 
"\Vas properly a .part ~of the record in the case, because 
it haq no applicability to the situation involved here. 
This exhibit does not need to be considered by the Court 
unl~ss the Court should agree with the Attorney Gen-
eral's argun1ent on the preceding point to the effect that 
the State Insurance Fund policy covering J. :.M~artin 
Stock, an individual, must automatically cover the cor-
poration, Intern1ountain Service Bureau, Inc., which was 
his business successor. 
We have called a tt~ntion to the wording of Exhibit 
B, which referred only to ''insurance companies''; and 
to the fact that the State Insurance Fund is not an in-
surance company. We have also c-alled attention to 
various sections in Title 42, Chapter 2, of the Utah Code 
Annotated, which provide for premium payments and 
· ter.mination of Fund policies in an entirely different 
1nanner than that which applies to policies in private 
insurance companies. In his brief the Attorney General 
has sin1ply ignored the references which \Ve made to 
Sections 42-1-49, 42-2-3, 42-2-4, 42-2-7 and 42-2-11 of the 
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Utah Code ~\.nnotated. In the latter part ·of his brief he 
quotes the "~ording of section 40-1 9-1~~ of Chapter G3, 
La\Ys of Utah 1947, \Yhich rPads as follo\Ys: 
..c\.11 insurance con1panies \Yriting ,,·orlnnen 's 
compensation insurance and occupational disease 
insurance in thi~ state and the Connnission of Fi-
nance in oonnection \\~ith its adininistrati,on of 
the State Insurance Fund, shail be subject to the 
rules and regulations of the Industrial Con1n1is-
sion. Said C'onunissio.n nzay pro vide the n~ethods 
to be used by tlzenz -in the pay1Jtent of co?npensa-
tion and benefits. The Industrial Con1n1ission 
may provide uniforn1 rates to be charged by such 
companies but such rates need not be uniforn1 
'vith the rate·s fixed for the State Insurance Fund. 
Prior to the year 1941, \Yhen the State Insuranee 
Fund was under the adn1inistrati~on of the Industrial 
Con1n1ission, Section 43-3-38 read as follows: 
All insurance con1panies- _writing W 1orkn1en's 
compensation insurance in this state under the 
terms of the title Industrial Commission, shall be 
subject to the rules and regulations of the indus-
trial commission. Said commission may provide 
uniform .rates to be charged by such companies 
and the· methods to be used by them in the pay-
ment of compensation and benefits, but such rates 
need not be uniform with the rates fixed for the 
state insurance fund, 
The c~anges made by the 1941 Legislature trans-
ferred from the Industrial Commission to the Finance 
Commission the matter of making premium rates for 
the State Insurance Fund. But the povver to 1nake 
premium rates f.or ''insurance eompanies'' was left vvith 
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the Industrial Com1nission. And the n1ethods to be used 
by insurance companies and the State Insurance Fund 
in 1naking payn1ent of con1pensation and benefits were 
left under the authority of the Industrial Con1n1ission. 
In vie'v of the changes \V hich the 1941 Legislature 
1nade in the sections of Title 42, Chapter 2, renl'oving the 
adn1inistration of the State Insurance Fund fron1 the 
Industrial Con11nission,-· the 1niddle sentence of Section 
43-3-38, (which in 1947 becan1e Section 43-19-13 as above-
Inen tioned) : 
Said Connn,ission rnay provide the 1nethods to 
pe used by thent in the payrnent of co1npensation 
and bene fits, 
IS a very good exan1ple of a statute in \vhich the rule, 
".<expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is applicable 
It is even n1ore clear-cut than the statute involved in the 
case of ]Jansen vs. Board of Echtcation) 101 Utah 15, 
116 Pac. (2nd) 936. 
The Legislature has provided in Section 42-2-3: 
The con1mi ssion of finance shall adn1inister 
the state insurance fund, \Vrite con1pensation in-
surance therein, conduct all business thereto ap-
pertaining and belonging, and do any and all 
things in connection \Vi th all insurance business to 
be carried on, supervised or controlled by the com-
n1ission of finance agreeably to the provision of 
this title, and it is vested with full authority over 
said fund.. 
This and the other sections of the san1e chapter, are 
inconsistent with the Industrial Com1nission exercising 
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·supervision or control over the cancellation or terinina-
tion of .State Insurance Fund policies. The provisions of 
the section quoted by the ..._-\..ttorney General do not apply 
to the State Insuranee Fund except as to the 'JJtethods 
to be used in the pay nz ent of con~pensatiou and benefits 
under the \Yorkn1en 's con1pensa.tion and occupational 
disease la\YS. 
There are certain 1nis-staten1ents of facts in the 
.Attorney General's brief, relating to the i11atter of can-
cellation or termination of State Insurance Fund_ policies. 
On Page 2 of his brief he declares that the State Insur~ 
ance Fund made no effort to advise the Industrial Conl-
nrission of the lapsation of the policy _of J. Martin Stock, 
operating as Merchant Police. This is contrary to the 
reeord. The State Insurance Fund did send to the In-
dustrial Commission copies of each of the notices \vhich 
"\vere sent to the policy holder to the effect that his poilcy 
had been cancelled. (Tr. 48-51, and Deft's Exhibits 2 
and 3.) 
The State Insurance Fund has always followed the 
practice of sending copies to the Industrial Commission 
of the notifications that policies have been canc~lled. 
Such copies are sent to the Commission immediately 
after the cancellation takes place.. Therefore, the In-
dustrial Commission has it within its power to take such 
steps as it deems proper, to prevent an employer from 
operating his business with three or more employees, 
without procuring workmen's compensation insurance 
to cover his employees, as provided by the statutes. 
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Asstuning, for the purpose of further discussion, 
that the Supre1ne Court 1night hold that our argument 
i~ not \Yell taken ,,~jth respect to any of the points \Ve 
l1aYe heretofore discussed, there are tV\ro further mat-
ters 'vhich \Vould be proper to consider, relating to Ex-
hibit B. 
Exhibit B is, on the face of it, a motion passed by 
the Industrial Con1n1ission on October 14, 1947. It pur-
ports to he and clearly \vas intended to be a general order 
of the Industrial Coinrnission, inasn1uch as it atten1pts 
to apply certain rules generally to all insuJ;ance coin-
panies \vriting \Vorkmen 's con1pensati!on insurance. Sec-
tion 42-1-19 reads as follovvs: 
All general orders of the co1nn1ission shall 
take effect thirty days ·after their publication, 
unless 'Other,vise provided, and special orders 
shall take effect as therein directed. The com-
n1ission shall, upon application of any employer 
or any person, grant an extension'"' of time for 
co1npliance -vvith any order, if it finds such exten-
sion of tin1e necessary. -
Ina~1nuch as T~Jxhibit B, being a general order of the 
Indnstrial Con11nission, did not specify any date ,, .. hen 
it should beco1ne effective, it \vould take effect t~irty 
da~-s after its publication. Theref1oTe, its effective date 
could not be prior to N ove1nber 13, 1947. Even if the 
State Insurance Fund's policy covering J. Martin Stock, 
doing business as Merchants Police, could be construed 
as ren1aining in force after July 1, 1947, it was cancelled 
n1idnight N oven1ber 12, 1947, by reason of ~the notice of 
intention to cancel which had been previously mailed 
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to ~Ir. Stock by the State Insurance Fund. (Tr. 48, 49, 
53, 37.) Consequently~ under no theory or application 
of any of the n rgn1nent contained in the A~ttorney Gen-
eral's brief could the tern1s of the Industrial Conunis-
sion's order (Exhibit B) be construed as applying to the 
policy \Yhich eoYered J. ~Iartin Stock, doing business as 
nierchants Police. That policy \\"a.S already cancelled 
before the· effectiYe date of the Industrial Conunission's 
o_rder. 
Even if the argtmlent of the Attorney General was 
-accepted to the effect that the policy covering~ J. Martin 
Stock must autoinatically continue to cover his successor, 
the Intermotmtain Service Bureau, Inc., and even though 
that policy \Yould have remained in force until midnight 
November 12, 1947, under the possible theory above-
nlentioned, this policy eould not have covered the hernia 
w·hich ~Ir. Dy~es claiined he sustained in the course of 
his employment for the follovving reasons: In his appli-
cation for compensation he -mentioned haviiig had tvvo 
accidents, one on the night of N'ovember 11, 1947, and 
the other one on the evening of November 25, 1947. His 
testimony at the hearing quite clearly shows that he did 
not sustain any hernia as the result of the accident vvhich 
occurred on the night of November 11th. He testified 
that he had a fall on November 11th which knocked his. 
breath out and this accident got his uniform all dirty. 
(Tr. 16, 17 and 23.) He also testified that it was the 
accidental fall which he received on the evening of No-
vember 25th which caused him to have a pain in his· 
groin and which' apparently resulted in his hernia. (Tr. 
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17, 18 and 30.) There is no possible theory by which the 
State Insurance Fund's policy covering J. Martin Stock 
could be construed as being in force and covering this 
accident on November 25, 1947. 
For the foregoing reasons the a''Tard of the Indus-
trial Con1mission should be annulled, insofar as it applies 
to the State Insurance Fund. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney· for Plaintiff. 
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